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SecurityAbstract With the rapid growth of the Internet, a lot of electronic patient records (EPRs) have
been developed for e-medicine systems. The security and privacy issues of EPRs are important
for the patients in order to understand how the hospitals control the use of their personal informa-
tion, such as name, address, e-mail, medical records, etc. of a particular patient. Recently, Lee et al.
proposed a simple group password-based authenticated key agreement protocol for the integrated
EPR information system (SGPAKE). However, in this paper, we show that Lee et al.’s protocol is
vulnerable to the off-line weak password guessing attack and as a result, their scheme does not pro-
vide users’ privacy. To withstand this security weakness found in Lee et al.’s scheme, we aim to pro-
pose an effective dynamic group password-based authenticated key exchange scheme for the
integrated EPR information system, which retains the original merits of Lee et al.’s scheme.
Through the informal and formal security analysis, we show that our scheme provides users’ pri-
vacy, perfect forward security and known-key security, and also protects online and offline pass-
word guessing attacks. Furthermore, our scheme efficiently supports the dynamic group
password-based authenticated key agreement for the integrated EPR information system. In addi-
tion, we simulate our scheme for the formal security verification using the widely-accepted AVISPA
A secure effective dynamic group password-based authenticated key agreement scheme 69(Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool and show that our
scheme is secure against passive and active attacks.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In an integrated EPR (electronic patient record) information
system of all the patients, the medical institutions and the aca-
demia with most of the patients’ information in details for
them, can make the corrective decisions and clinical decisions
in order to maintain and analyze patients’ health. In such sys-
tems, the illegal access needs to be avoided as well as the infor-
mation from theft during transmission over the insecure
Internet needs to be prevented.
A dynamic group key agreement protocol provides the
mechanisms to process member addition and deletion. Several
dynamic group key agreement protocols have been proposed
in the literature. We can divide the group key agreement pro-
tocols into two categories (Lee et al., 2013). The first one is the
group key agreement protocols with public key. For example,
key agreement protocols proposed by Tzeng and Tzeng (2000),
Tzeng (2002), Boyd and Nieto (2003), Kim et al. (2004), Lee
et al. (2006), and Jeong and Lee (2007) employ the public
key infrastructure (PKI) and provide higher security. How-
ever, they are required to maintain the complex and heavy
public key systems and users must hold extra storage for keep-
ing public/private key pairs. The second one is the group
password-based key agreement protocols (GPKE) without
public key. For example, key agreement protocols of Lee
et al. (2004), Abdalla et al. (2006), and Dutta and Barua
(2006) provide the same password to all communicating par-
ties. That is, each user does not have his/her own private pass-
word, and thus, the user cannot have his/her privacy.
However, Zhang et al. (2012) showed that Dutta and Barua’s
scheme (Dutta and Barua, 2006) is insecure, where their
scheme does not satisfy the key independence property
(Steiner et al., 2000) and any two malicious users whose logic
indexes are not adjacent in the former execution of the proto-
col may mount a replay attack in new protocol executions.
Hence, these password-based approaches are not much suit-
able for many practical scenarios (Lee et al., 2013).
Boyd and Nieto (2003) described the first conference key
agreement protocol, which can be completed in a single round.
However, their scheme lacks forward secrecy property. By the
forward secrecy property, we mean that when a node (user)
leaves the network, it must not read any future messages after
its departure. Kim et al. (2004) proposed an efficient and
secure constant-round authenticated key agreement protocol
(AGKE) for dynamic groups in the random oracle model.
Dutta and Barua (2006) proposed a variant of Kim et al.’s
scheme (Kim et al., 2004). Dutta–Barua’s scheme makes use
of the ideal-cipher model, instead of a simple mask, and they
claimed that their scheme is secure against dictionary attacks.
Unfortunately, their scheme contains another source of redun-
dancy that can be exploited by an attacker (Abdalla et al.,
2006). In 2006, Abdalla et al. (2006) proposed the first
provably-secure password-based constant-round group key
exchange protocol. It is provably-secure in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models, which makes use of the deci-
sional Diffie–Hellman problem assumption.
Recently, Lee et al. (2013) have proposed a simple group
password-based authenticated key protocol without the ser-
ver’s public key, called the SGPAKE protocol, for the inte-
grated EPR information system. Their scheme is based on
Abdalla and Pointcheval’s scheme (Abdalla and Pointcheval,
2005). Lee et al.’s SGPAKE protocol does not use any long-
term key or public-key system. Lee et al. (2013) claimed that
SGPAKE protocol provides each user a unique private weak
password and resists password-guessing attack, and thus their
scheme provides user privacy and data privacy. However, in
this paper, we show that any user Ui in a group Sn can derive
the private password of the user Ui1 by setting the off-line
password guessing attack, so that it does not provide the user’s
privacy. We aim to propose an improvement on Lee et al.’s
SGPAKE protocol while retaining the original merits of Lee
et al.’s scheme. Through the formal and informal security anal-
ysis, we show that our improved scheme provides user’s pri-
vacy and perfect forward security, and also resists the offline
password guessing attack.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we provide the properties of the one-way hash function,
discrete logarithm problem and group Diffie–Hellman prob-
lem. In Sections 3 and 4, we review Lee et al.’s SGPAKE pro-
tocol and then discuss the security flaws of Lee et al.’s
SGPAKE protocol, respectively. We explain our improved
scheme in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide the security of
our improved scheme. Through the informal and formal secu-
rity analysis, we show that our improved scheme is provably
secure against an adversary for protecting the user’s privacy
and perfect forward security. In Section 7, we simulate our
scheme for the formal security verification using the widely-
accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications) tool and show that our scheme is
secure. In Section 8, we compare the performances of our
scheme with other related existing schemes. Finally, we con-
clude the paper in Section 9.2. Mathematical preliminaries
In this section, we discuss the properties of the one-way hash
function, discrete logarithm problem and group Diffie–Hell-
man problem, which are useful for describing Lee et al.’s
SGPAKE protocol (Lee et al., 2013) and its security analysis
as well as our improved scheme.
2.1. One-way hash function
A one-way collision-resistant hash function
h : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gn is a deterministic algorithm (Sarkar,
2010; Stinson, 2006) that takes an input as an arbitrary length
binary string x 2 f0; 1g and outputs a binary string
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sary A’s advantage in finding collision is given as follows
AdvHASHA ðtÞ ¼ Pr½ðx; x0Þ(RA : x ¼ x0 and hðxÞ ¼ hðx0Þ;
where Pr½E denotes the probability of an event E in a random
experiment, and ðx; x0Þ(RA denotes the pair ðx; x0Þ is selected
randomly by A. In this case, the adversary A is allowed to be
probabilistic and the probability in the advantage is computed
over the random choices made by the adversary A with the
execution time t. The hash function hðÞ is said to be
collision-resistant if AdvHASHA ðtÞ 6 , for any sufficiently small
 > 0.
An example of a secure one-way function is SHA-1 (Secure
Hash Standard, 2010). One of the fundamental properties of a
secure one-way hash function is that its outputs are very sen-
sitive to small perturbations in inputs (Das, 2011). Recently
proposed hash algorithm, Quark (Aumasson et al., 2010) is
an efficient hash function than SHA-1. However, at present,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
does not recommend SHA-1 for top secret documents any-
more. In 2011, Manuel showed that SHA-1 is insecure against
collision attacks (Manuel, 2011). In this paper, as in Das and
Goswami (2013) and Das et al. (2013), we can use SHA-2 as
the secure one-way hash function for achieving top security.
However, we use only 160-bits from the hash digest output
of SHA-2 in Lee et al.’s SGPAKE scheme and our improved
scheme.
2.2. Discrete logarithm problem (Das, 2013; Das et al., 2012)
Given an element g in a finite group G whose order is n, that
is, n ¼ #Gg (Gg is the subgroup of G generated by g) and
another element y in Gg. The problem is to find the smallest
non-negative integer x such that gx ¼ y. In this problem,
known as the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), it is
relatively easy to calculate discrete exponentiation
y ¼ gxðmod pÞ given g; x and n using the repeated square-
and-multiply algorithm (Stallings, 2003), but it is computa-
tionally infeasible to determine x given y; g and n, when n is
large. The formal definition of DLP is given in Definition 1
(Section 6.3).
2.3. Group Diffie–Hellman problem (Bresson et al., 2003)
Let G be a cyclic group, whose order be a prime n, that is,
#G ¼ n. Let g be a generator of G. For a given set of values
gPxi for some choice of xi from the set f1; 2; . . . ; ng, computing
the common group Diffie–Hellman secret gx1x2 ...xn is computa-
tionally infeasible, when n is large. The formal definition of the
group Diffie–Hellman problem can be found in Bresson et al.
(2003).
3. Review of Lee et al.’s SGPAKE protocol
In this section, we briefly review the recently proposed Lee
et al.’s SGPAKE protocol (Lee et al., 2013) in order to show
the cryptanalysis on their scheme.
Lee et al.’s scheme consists of three phases, namely, the user
registration phase, authenticated key exchange phase and pass-
word change phase. Each user needs to remember his/her weakprivate password, which is shared with a trusted server S. For
describing Lee et al.’s scheme, we use the notations listed in
Table 1. Assume that Ui; ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ are n communicating
parties, S is the trusted integrated EPR information system
server. Gg is a multiplicative group generated by the generator
g; p is a large prime, and M;N are large numbers, which
are made public. Zp ¼ f1; 2; 3; . . . ; p 1g is the set of all
positive integers less than p and relatively prime to p. In other
words, Zp ¼ faj0 < a < n; gcdða; nÞ ¼ 1g, where gcdðx; yÞ
denotes the greatest common divisor (gcd) of two integers
x and y, and can be calculated efficiently using the repeated
applications of the Euclid’s division algorithm (Stallings,
2003).3.1. User registration phase
In the user registration phase, a user needs to register to the
server S before accessing the services from S. For registering,
each new user Ui needs to select his/her chosen random nonce
xi. After that the user Ui sends this nonce xi to the server S via
a secure channel.3.2. Authenticated key exchange phase
This phase consists of the following steps::
Step 1. Ui ! S : m1 ¼ fgxiMpwig
 User Ui chooses a private weak password pwi, which is
shared with the trusted server S.
 User Ui computes gxi and gxiMpwi , using the selected ran-
dom nonce xi, chosen password pwi and public keyM of
Ui in the user registration phase.
 User Ui then sends the message hm1i to the server S via a
public channel, where m1 ¼ fgxiMpwig.
Step 2. S ! Ui : m2 ¼ fgyiNpwi ;EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K 0ig
 After receiving the message hm1i from the user Ui in Step
1, the server S chooses a random nonce yi.
 Server S then computes
gyi ; gyiNpwi ; gxi ¼ gxi MpwiMpwi ; Ki1  ðgxi1 Þyi1 ðmod pÞ and
K 0i  ðgxiþ1Þyi ðmod pÞ, for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n. Note that N is
the public key of S.
 After that the server S encrypts the information
ðSn;Ki1;K 0iÞ with the key Ki as EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K 0i, where
Ki ¼ ðgxiÞyiðmod pÞ.
 Finally, the server S sends the message hm2i to the user
Ui via a public channel, where
m2 ¼ fgyiNpwi ;EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K 0ig.
Step 3. Ui! : m3 ¼ fX ig
 After receiving the message hm2i in Step 2 from the ser-
ver S, the user Ui computes the key Ki ¼
ðgyi NpwiNpwi Þ
xi ¼ gxiyi ðmod pÞ, and then obtains the informa-
tion Ki1 and K 0i by decrypting EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K 0i with key
Ki as ðSn;Ki1;K 0iÞ ¼ DKi ½EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K 0i.
 If the user Ui successfully verifies EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K 0i, he/she
computes Zi ¼ ðKi1Þxi  gxi1yi1xi ðmod pÞ; Ziþ1 ¼
ðK 0iÞxi  gxiyixiþ1 ðmod pÞ and X i ¼ Ziþ1Zi ¼
gxiyixiþ1
gxi1yi1xi .
Table 1 Notations used in this paper.
Symbol Description
S Trusted integrated EPR information system server
Ui A communicating user
IDi Identity of the user Ui
pwi The private password of the user Ui
eki Symmetric encryption key of the user Ui
Sn A dynamic group of n members
HðÞ Secure one-way collision-resistant hash function
p A large prime
g A generator in group Zp
M;N Public keys
EKðÞ=DKðÞ Symmetric encryption/decryption using the key K
A! B : X Entity A sends a message X to entity B via a public
channel
C1;C2 Data C1 is concatenated with data C2
Table 2 Summary of message exchanges during the user
registration, authenticated key exchange and password change
phases of Lee et al.’s scheme (Lee et al., 2013).
Registration phase
Ui ! S : pwi;xi
(via a secure channel)
Authenticated key exchange phase
Ui ! S : m1 ¼ fgxiMpwig
S! Ui : m2 ¼ fgyiNpwi ;EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K0ig
Ui! : m3 ¼ fXig
Ui! : m4 ¼ fAuthi1;Authi2g
Password change phase
Ui ! S : IDi; pwi; pw0i
(via a secure channel)
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m3 ¼ fX ig, to its group members in Sn via a public
channel.
Step 4. Ui! : m4 ¼ fAuthi1;Authi2g
 After receiving the message hm3i in Step 3, the user Ui
computes the secret value ski ¼ Zni  Xn1iþ1  Xn2iþ2    
X iþn11 ¼ gx1y1x2þx2y2x3þþxnynx1 ðmod pÞ.
 Ui computes the key conformation signatures
ðAuthi1;Authi2Þ, where Authi1 ¼ HðSn; ski;UiÞ and
Authi2 ¼ HðSn;K 0iÞ.
 Ui then broadcasts the message hm4i, where
m4 ¼ fAuthi1;Authi2g, via a public channel.
 Finally, Ui authenticates another user Uj by verifying
Authj1, for i–j, and computes the common session key
SK as SK ¼ HðSn; skiÞ. At the same time, the server S
also authenticates each user Ui by verifying Authi2. As a
result, by verifying Authi1 the mutual authentication a-
mong n users in a group Sn is achieved. On the other
hand, by verifying Authi2 the server S performs the mu-
tual authentication between the server S and n users in
the group Sn.
3.3. Password change phase
If a legitimate user Ui wants to change his/her password pwi,
he/she sends his/her identity IDi, the old password pwi and
the new password pw0i to the integrated EPR information sys-
tem S via a secure channel. The server S then checks the valid-
ity of IDi and the old password pwi. If these are valid, S
updates pwi with the new password pw
0
i.
The summary of message exchanges during the user regis-
tration, authenticated key exchange and password change
phases of Lee et al.’s scheme is shown in Table 2.
4. Cryptanalysis on Lee et al.’s SGPAKE protocol
In this section, we show that Lee et al.’s SGPAKE protocol is
insecure against the offline password guessing attacks.
Lee et al. claimed that their scheme can provide each user
with a private weak password and resist the password-
guessing attacks. As a result, Lee et al.’s scheme shouldprovide data privacy and user’s privacy. However, we show
that any user Ui in a group Sn can derive the password pwi1
of another user Ui1 in that group Sn through the off-line
password-guessing attacks. Thus, we show that Lee et al.’s
SGPAKE scheme does not provide the user’s privacy. A user
Ui, being an attacker in a group Sn, can obtain the password
pwi1 of another user Ui1 in that group Sn using the following
steps:
Step 1. The user Ui computes the key Ki as
Ki ¼ gyi NpwiNpwi
 xi ¼ gxiyi ðmod pÞ and then obtains Ki1
and K 0i by decrypting EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K 0i with key Ki as
ðSn;Ki1;K 0iÞ ¼ DKi ½EKi ½Sn;Ki1;K 0i.
Step 2. The user Ui obtains Ki2 and K 0i1 by decrypting
EKi1 ½Sn;Ki2;K 0i1 with the derived key Ki1 in Step
1 and then verifies the validity of K 0i1 using Authði1Þ2.
Step 3. The user Ui computes gyi1 as
gyi1 ¼ ðK 0i1Þx
1
i ðmod pÞ ¼ ðgxiyi1Þx1i ðmod pÞ, where
x1i ðmod pÞ is computed efficiently using the
extended Euclid’s algorithm (Stallings, 2003).
Step 4. The user Ui then computes Npwi1 as
Npwi1 ¼ gyi1Npwi1gyi1 ðmod pÞ from the message hm2i of
the userUi1.
Step 5. Note that the user Ui1’s private password pwi1 is a
weak password. A user Ui can set up the off-line
password-guessing attack to correctly obtain the pri-
vate password pw0i1 of the user Ui1 such that
Npw
0
i1 ¼ Npwi1 iterating all possible choices of pwi1.
This attack has the following steps:
Step 5.1. Ui selects a guessed password pw0i1 for the user
Ui1.
Step 5.2. Knowing the public information N of the server
S;Ui computes the value Npw
0
i1 .
Step 5.3. Ui compares the computed value Npw
0
i1 with the
derived value Npwi1 .
Step 5.4. If there is a match in Step 5.3, it indicates that the
correct guess of the user Ui1’s password pwi1.
Otherwise, Ui repeats from Step 5.1.
As a result, the user Ui, being an insider attacker, can suc-
ceed to guess the low-entropy password pwi1 of the user Ui1
in his/her own group Sn.
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In this section, we first describe the main motivation behind
our improved scheme. We then give a threat model under
which our scheme is analyzed. Finally, we discuss the various
phases related to our improved scheme.
5.1. Motivation
We have shown that any user Ui in a group Sn can derive the
password pwi1 of another user Ui1 in that group, Sn through
the off-line password-guessing attack. Thus, Lee et al.’s
SGPAKE scheme does not provide the user’s privacy. Hence,
we feel that there is a need to propose an improvement of Lee
et al.’s scheme to withstand the security flaw found in Lee
et al.’s SGPAKE scheme, while retaining the original merits
of Lee et al.’s SGPAKE scheme. Through the formal and
informal security analysis, we show that our improved scheme
provides user’s privacy and perfect forward security, and
resists the offline password guessing attack. We also show that
our scheme is efficient as compared to Lee et al.’s SGPAKE
scheme and other related existing schemes.
5.2. Threat model
As in Das and Goswami (2013), we use the Dolev–Yao threat
model (Dolev and Yao, 1983) in our improved scheme in
which two communicating parties communicate over an inse-
cure channel. Any adversary (attacker or intruder) can then
eavesdrop the transmitted messages over the public insecure
channel and he/she can modify, delete or change the contents
of the transmitted messages. We adopt the similar threat model
for our scheme, since the channel is insecure and the end-
points (users and server) cannot in general be trustworthy.
5.3. Description of our improved scheme
Our scheme consists of three phases, namely, the user registra-
tion phase, the authenticated key exchange phase and the pass-
word change phase. As in Lee et al.’s protocol, each user also
needs to only remember his/her weak password shared with a
trusted server S. However, even if the password of a user is
weak, our scheme resists the offline password guessing attack
as compared to Lee et al.’s scheme. For describing our scheme,
we also use the notations listed in Table 1. We assume that
Ui; ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ, are n communicating parties and S is
the trusted integrated EPR information system server. Gg is
a multiplicative group generated by the generator g; p is a large
prime so that it is intractable to a discrete logarithm, andM;N
are large public keys, which are made public, and
Zp ¼ f1; 2; 3; . . . ; p 1g.
We describe the user registration phase, the authenticated
key exchange phase and the password change phase in detail
in the following subsections.
5.3.1. User registration phase
As in Lee et al.’s scheme, in our proposed improved scheme a
user Ui first needs to register to the trusted server S before
accessing the services from S. For registering, each new user
Ui needs to generate his/her chosen random nonce xi, choose
a private password pwi and select an identity IDi. Then the userUi sends the registration request message hIDi; xi; pwii to the
server S via a secure channel.
5.3.2. Authenticated key exchange phase
Our authenticated key exchange phase consists of the follow-
ing steps:
Step 1. Ui ! S : m1 ¼ fgxiMpwig
Step 1.1. Each user Ui chooses a random nonce xi.
Step 1.2. Ui computes gxi and gxiMpwi , using the generator g
and public key M of the user Ui.
Step 1.3. Ui then sends the message hm1i, where
m1 ¼ fgxiMpwig, to the trusted integrated EPR
information system server S via a public channel.
Step 2. S ! Ui : m2 ¼ fgyiNpwi ;Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K 0ig
Step 2.1. S chooses a random nonce yi.
Step 2.2. S computes gyi ; gyiNpwi ; gxi ¼ gxi MpwiMpwi ;Ki1 
ðgxi1Þy2i1 ðmod pÞ, and K 0i  ðgxiþ1Þy
2
i ðmod pÞ,
using the password pwi of the user Ui, which is
already sent securely to the server S by the user
Ui during the registration phase, and N the public
key of the server S.
Step 2.3. S then computes encryption key
eki  ðgxiÞyiðmod pÞ, for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n. S encrypts
the information ðSn;Ki1;K 0iÞ using the computed
encryption key eki.
Step 2.4. Finally, S sends the message hm2i, where
m2 ¼ fgyiNpwi ;Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K 0ig, to the user Ui via
a public channel.
Step 3. Ui! : m3 ¼ fX ig
Step 3.1. Ui computes the encryption key
eki ¼ gyi NpwiNpwi
 xi ¼ gxiyi ðmod pÞ, and obtains Ki1
and K 0i by decrypting Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K 0i with the
computed key eki.
Step 3.2. If Ui successfully verifies Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K 0i, he/she
then computes Zi ¼ ðKi1Þxi  gxi1xiy2i1 ðmod pÞ;
Ziþ1 ¼ ðK 0iÞxi  gxixiþ1y
2
i ðmod pÞ, and X i ¼ Ziþ1Zi
¼ gxixiþ1y
2
i
g
xi1xiy2i1
ðmod pÞ.
Step 3.3. Finally, Ui broadcasts the message hm3i, where
m3 ¼ fX ig.
Step 4. Ui! : m4 ¼ fAuthi1;Authi2g
Step 4.1. After receiving the message hm3i in Step 3, Ui com-
putes the secret value ski as
ski ¼ Zni  Xn1i  Xn2iþ1      X1i2
¼ gx1y21x2þx2y22x3þþxny2nx1 ðmod pÞ:Step 4.2. Ui computes the key conformations
ðAuthi1;Authi2Þ, where Authi1 ¼ HðSn; ski;UiÞ and
Authi2 ¼ HðSn;K 0iÞ.
Step 4.3. Ui broadcasts the message hm4i, where
m4 ¼ fAuthi1;Authi2g.
Step 4.4. Finally, the user Ui authenticates another user Uj
in a group Sn by verifying Authj1, for i–j, and also
computes the common session key SK as
SK ¼ HðSn; skiÞ. At the same time, the server S
authenticates each user Ui by verifying Authi2.
Table 3 Summary of the user registration and authenticated key exchange phases of our scheme.
User Ui Server S
Registration phase
Generates random nonce xi, selects identity
IDi and password pwi.
!hIDi ;xi ;pwii
(via a secure channel)
Authenticated key exchange phase
Computes m1 ¼ gxiMpwi .
!hm1i
Chooses a random nonce yi, computes g
yiNpwi ,
gxi ¼ gxiMpwiMpwi ;Ki1  ðgxi1 Þy
2
i1 ðmod pÞ,
and K0i  ðgxiþ1 Þy
2
i ðmod pÞ.
Computes key eki  ðgxi Þyi ðmod pÞ,
for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n, and
encrypts ðSn;Ki1;K0iÞ using eki.
 hm2¼fg
yi Npwi ;Eeki ½Sn ;Ki1 ;K0i gi
Computes key eki ¼ gyi N
pwi
Npwi
 xi ¼ gxiyi ðmod pÞ,
retrieves ½Sn;Ki1;K0i ¼ Deki ½Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0i.
Verifies Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0i.
If it is successful, computes
Zi ¼ ðKi1Þxi  gxi1xiy2i1 ðmod pÞ,
Ziþ1 ¼ ðK0iÞxi  gxixiþ1y
2
i ðmod pÞ,
and Xi ¼ Ziþ1Zi ¼
g
xixiþ1y2i
g
xi1xiy2i1
ðmod pÞ.
Broadcasts the message hm3 ¼ fXigi
Computes ski ¼ Zni  Xn1i      X1i2
¼ gx1y21x2þx2y22x3þþxny2nx1 ðmod pÞ.
Computes Authi1 ¼ HðSn; ski;UiÞ
and Authi2 ¼ HðSn;K0iÞ.
Broadcasts the message hm4 ¼ fAuthi1;Authi2gi.
Verifies Authj1, for i–j for each user Uj.
Verifies Authi2 for each user Ui.
Computes common session key SK ¼ HðSn; skiÞ.
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among n users in a group Sn is achieved. On the other hand,
by verifying Authi2, the mutual authentication between the ser-
ver S and n users in the group, Sn is also achieved.
5.3.3. Password change phase
If a legitimate user Ui wants to change his/her password pwi,
he/she needs to send his/her identity IDi, the old password
pwi and the new password pw
0
i to the integrated EPR informa-
tion system S via a secure channel. After receiving the pass-
word change request, the server S verifies the pair ðIDi; pwiÞ.
If it is a valid pair, the server S then replaces the old password
pwi with the new password pw
0
i in its database.
The summary of our scheme is given in Table 3.
6. Analysis of our proposed scheme
In this section, we first show that all users in a group Sn have
the same secret key. After that through the informal and for-
mal security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure
against different attacks.6.1. Correctness of the protocol
The correctness proof of our scheme is given in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. In our improved scheme, all users
Ui ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ in a group Sn have the same secret session
key SK.Proof. Let Ui be a user in a group Sn consisting of n members.
The user Ui in a group Sn computes the secret value ski as
ski ¼ Zni  Xn1i  Xn2iþ1      X1i2
¼ Zni  ðZiþ1=ZiÞn1  ðZiþ2=Ziþ1Þn2      ðZi1=Zi2Þ1
¼
Yn
i¼1
Zi
¼ gx1y21x2þx2y22x3þþxny2nx1 ðmod pÞ:
As a result, all users Ui ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ in the group Sn have
the same secret session key SK as SK ¼ HðSn; skiÞ. h
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In this section, we show that our scheme is secure against var-
ious known attacks. For security analysis, we use the threat
model described in Section 5.2.
6.2.1. Session key security
In our scheme, no adversary can compute
Zið¼ gxi1xiy2i1 ðmod pÞÞ even if he/she has the knowledge of
gxi1 ; gxi and gy
2
i1 . This problem is computationally difficult
due to difficulty of solving the group Diffie–Hellman problem
(Bresson et al., 2003). Moreover, the secret value ski depends
on the one-time random secrets xi and yi ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ.
Thus, computing the secret session key SK ¼ HðSn; skiÞ with-
out computing Zi is a computationally infeasible for the adver-
sary. Therefore, our scheme provides the session key security.
6.2.2. Mutual authentication
As in Lee et al.’s scheme (Lee et al., 2013), each legal user Ui
can decrypt the information in message hm2i using its own
password pwi, and then compute the one-time encryption key
eki. Additionally, each user Ui can authenticate the server S
by verifying the ciphertext Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0i, whereas the server
S can also authenticate each user Ui by verifying Authi2. Fur-
thermore, each user Ui can authenticate the other users Uj’s
ði–jÞ by verifying Authj1 in a group Sn. Our scheme then
achieves the mutual authentication between the users and the
server, and also among all the users in a group Sn.
6.2.3. Perfect forward security
By the forward security, we mean that when a node (user)
leaves the network, it must not read any future messages after
its departure. Forward secrecy thus ensures that the subse-
quent shared session keys cannot be derived even if an adver-
sary knows the contiguous subset of old session keys. In our
scheme, the session key SK is the secret value
ski ¼ gx1y21x2þx2y22x3þþxny2nx1 ðmod pÞ, which depends on only
the one-time random secrets xi and yi’s ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ. Since
the random secrets are not dependent on the private password
pwi of a user Ui, no adversary can compute the previous ses-
sion keys even if he/she knows private password pwi of that
user Ui. Thus, our proposed scheme provides the perfect for-
ward security to the established session key SK.
6.2.4. Off-line password guessing attack
In the following, we explain how our improved scheme has the
ability to resist the weaknesses of Lee et al.’s SGPAKE
scheme. From the received message hm2i in Step 2 during
our authenticated key exchange phase, a user Ui in a group
Sn can compute the encryption key eki ¼ gxiyi ðmod pÞ, and
obtain Ki1, and K
0
i by decrypting Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0i with the
computed encryption key eki, where
Ki1  ðgxi1 Þy
2
i1 ðmod pÞ and K0i  ðgxiþ1Þy
2
i ðmod pÞ. Since
xi1 (chosen by the user) and yi1 (chosen by the server) are
random nonces corresponding to the user Ui1, the user Ui
cannot compute gxi1 and gyi1 using the derived Ki1 and K
0
i,
due to difficulty of solving discrete logarithm problem. The
user Ui needs to guess both private password, say pw
0
i1 and
one-time random secret, say x0i1 of the user Ui1 such thatthe condition gx
0
i1Mpw
0
i1 ðmod pÞ ¼ gxi1Mpwi1 ðmod pÞ holds.
Then, the guessed pair ðpw0i1; x0i1Þ may probably be the orig-
inal pair. However, as pointed out in Das and Goswami
(2013), the probability of guessing a correct password pw0i1
of composed n characters is 	 1
26n
and the probability of guess-
ing a correct random nonce xi1 of 1024-bit is 	 121024. More-
over, to guess a correct pw0i1, the attacker has to guess the
correct x0i1, which is of 1024-bit. Thus, the probability of
guessing the probably correct pair ðpw0i1; x0i1Þ is 	 126nþ1024. If
n ¼ 10, the success probability is approximately 1
260þ1024, which
is negligible. The user Ui can not computeM
pwi1 from message
hm1 ¼ fgxi1Mpwi1gi and Npwi1 from gyi1Npwi1 without know-
ing gxi1 and gyi1 , respectively. Therefore, the user Ui has no
way to guess the password correctly of other users in a group
Sn with the available public parameters, and hence, our scheme
resists the off-line password-guessing attacks.
6.2.5. Undetectable on-line password guessing attack
Suppose an adversary, distinguished as the user Ui, guesses a
password, say pw0i and communicates with the server S. But
in Step 4 of our authenticated key exchange phase, to compute
the authentication parameters Authi1ð¼ HðSn; ski;UiÞÞ and
Authi2ð¼ HðSn;K0iÞÞ, the adversary needs to retrieve the origi-
nal Ki1 and K
0
i from the ciphertext Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0i. Comput-
ing Ki1 and K
0
i without knowledge of the encryption key
ekið¼ gxiyi ðmod pÞÞ and computing Zi (used in computing
ski) without knowing the correct pair ðpwi; xiÞ are computa-
tionally infeasible tasks to the attacker. Thus, a failed pass-
word guessing will be detected by other users as well as the
server. On other hand, suppose an adversary, distinguished
as the server S, guesses a password, say pw0i and communicates
with the users Ui’s in a group Sn. After receiving the message
hm1i from the user Ui, the adversary needs to compute
gxi ¼ gxiMpw
0
i
M
pw0
i
using a guessed password pw0i. Then, the adversary
needs to compute Ki1 and K
0
ið¼ ðgxiþ1Þy
2
i ðmod pÞÞ;
Ki1ð¼ ðgxi1Þy
2
i1 ðmod pÞÞ and the encryption key
ekið¼ gxiyiðmod pÞÞ. Moreover, the adversary has to compute
the ciphertext Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0i and send the message, say
m02ð¼ fgxiMpw
0
i ;Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0igÞ to the user Ui. Since the user
Ui can verify hm02i in Step 3 of our authenticated key exchange
phase, a failed password guessing will be detected by the user
Ui. As a result, our scheme prevents the undetectable on-line
password guessing attack.
6.2.6. Data privacy and users’ privacy
In our improved scheme, computing a session key is computa-
tionally infeasible task as described in Section 6.2.1. So, no
adversary can decrypt the transmitted data without the com-
mon session key. Moreover, our scheme provides private pass-
word to each user in a group and also prevents the password
guessing attacks. Therefore, our scheme provides data privacy
as well as users’ privacy, whereas Lee et al.’s scheme does not
provide the users’ privacy as their scheme is vulnerable to off-
line password-guessing attacks.
6.2.7. Known-key security
Each run of our authenticated key exchange phase between a
specific user Ui and the server S produces a unique session
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known key security, the knowledge of previous session keys
does not allow an adversary to compromise other previous ses-
sion keys or future session keys (Ammayappan et al., 2011).
Since the session key is different for different sessions and they
are independent among each protocol execution, our improved
scheme also exhibits the known-key security property.
6.3. Formal security analysis
We follow the formal security proof of our improved scheme
as in Das (2013), Das et al. (2012) and Odelu et al. (2014).
For this purpose, we first formally define the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP). We present the formal security proof of our
scheme only for users’ privacy and perfect forward security
in Theorem 2, whereas other security analyses are already pro-
vided in Section 6.2. For the formal security analysis, we fol-
low the method using the random oracle model as used in
Chatterjee et al. (2014), Das et al. (2013), Islam and Biswas
(2013) and Islam and Biswas, 2014.
Deﬁnition 1. (Formal definition of discrete logarithm problem
(Das, 2013)) Let G be a cyclic group of order q; g a generator of
G, and A1 an algorithm that return an integer in Zq, where
Zq ¼ f0; 1; . . . ; q 1g. Let a2RT denote that the element a is
chosen randomly from the set T. Consider the following
experiment, EXP1DLPG;g ðA1Þ in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1.
EXP1DLPG;g ðA1Þ
1: x2RZq
2: X gxðmod qÞ
3: x0 ¼ A1ðXÞ
4: if gx
0 ¼ X ðmod qÞ then
5: return 1 (TRUE)
6: else
7: return 0 (FALSE)
8: end if
The DLP advantage of A1 is defined by
AdvDLPG;g ðA1Þ ¼ Pr½EXP1DLPG;g ðA1Þ ¼ 1, where Pr½E denotes the
probability of an event E in a random experiment. The discrete
logarithm problem (DLP) is called a hard problem (computa-
tionally infeasible problem) in G if the DLP-advantage of any
adversary of reasonable resources is small. Here the resources
are measured in terms of the time complexity of the adversary
including its code size as usual. In other words, we call the
DLP as a hard problem, if AdvDLPG;g ðA1Þ 6 , for any sufficiently
small  > 0.
Theorem 2. Under the assumption of the discrete logarithm
problem, our improved scheme is provably secure against an
adversary for protecting users’ privacy and perfect forward
security.
Proof. In this proof, we need to construct an adversary A
from a dynamic group Sn consisting of n users, who can obtainthe private password of the other members in that group Sn
using the available information including his/her own private
password. In order to construct such an adversary A, we con-
sider the following random oracle:
 Reveal: This oracle unconditionally outputs the value x 2 Zq
from the given public value g xðmod qÞ, where g is the gen-
erator in the cyclic group G of order q.
Assume that the adversary A is a user Ui in the dynamic
group Sn. The adversary A needs to run the experimental
algorithm EXP2DLPIP;A for our improved protocol, say IP, given
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2.
EXP2DLPIP;A
1: Ui (being an adversary A) eavesdrops the message
m2 ¼ fgyiNpwi ;Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0ig sent from the server S.
2: Ui computes g
yi ¼ gyi NpwiNpwi using his/her private password pwi
and public N.
3: Ui obtains Ki1 and K0i by decrypting Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0i using the
encryption key eki, where eki ¼ ðgyi Þxi ðmod pÞ.
4: Call Reveal oracle on input gyi . Let y0i  Revealðgyi Þ.
5: Ui computes g
xiþ1 ¼ ðK0iÞðy
0
iÞ2 ðmod pÞ and then computes
Mpwiþ1 ¼ gxiþ1Mpwiþ1gxiþ1 .
6: Call Reveal oracle on input Mpwiþ1 . Let
pw0iþ1  RevealðMpwiþ1 Þ.
7: if Mpw
0
iþ1 ¼Mpwiþ1 ðmod pÞ then
8: return 1 (TRUE)
9: else
10: return 0 (FALSE)
11: end if
We now define the success for EXP2DLPIP;A as
SuccDLPIP;A ¼ jPr½EXP2DLPIP;A ¼ 1  1j and the advantage function
for our improved protocol, IP due to this experiment as
AdvDLPIP ðt; qRÞ ¼ maxAfSuccDLPIP;Ag, where the maximum is con-
sidered over all A with execution time t and qR is the number
of queries made to the Reveal oracle. Consider the experi-
ment EXP2DLPIP;A for the adversary A for our improved scheme,
IP. If A has the ability to solve DLP, the adversary wins the
game, and thus, the adversary obviously can easily compute
the nonce yi from the public message g
yiNpwi using his/her pri-
vate password pwi. Using the derived nonce yi and K
0
i, he/she
can compute the private password pwiþ1 of the user Uiþ1. In
this case, the adversary can derive the private passwords of
all users in the dynamic group Sn. However, from Definition
1, DLP is a hard problem, that is, AdvDLPG;g ðA1Þ 6 , for any suf-
ficiently small  > 0. Hence, AdvDLPIP ðt; qRÞ 6 , since
AdvDLPIP ðt; qRÞ depends on AdvDLPG;g ðA1Þ. As a result, there is no
feasible way for the adversary to obtain the private password
of any other user in the group Sn. Therefore, our proposed
protocol provides the users’ privacy.
A compromised password does not yield any previous
session keys SK, because the session key SK ¼ HðSn; skiÞ,
where ski ¼ gx1y21x2þx2y22x3þþxny2nx1ðmod pÞ, depends on the
temporarily chosen random nonces x1; x2; . . . ; xn and
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a result, our improved scheme preserves the perfect security
property. h7. Simulation for formal security veriﬁcation using AVISPA tool
In this section, we examine our scheme through simulation for
the formal security verification using the widely-accepted
AVISPA tool (Das, 2013; Das et al., 2013), and show that
our scheme is secure against active attacks, such as replay
and man-in-the-middle attacks.
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Pro-
tocols and Applications) stands for a push-button tool for
the automated validation of Internet security-sensitive proto-
cols and applications (AVISPA, 2013). AVISPA consists of
four different back-ends that implement a variety of state-of-
the-art automatic analysis techniques, which are called the
On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC), Constraint Logic based
Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based Model-Checker
(SATMC), and Tree Automata based on Automatic Approxi-
mations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). The
protocols to be analyzed under the AVISPA tool require to
specify them in a high-level language, called HLPSL (High
Level Protocols Specification Language), which is a role-
oriented language. The specification written in HLPSL is first
translated into a low-level specification by a translator, called
HLPSL2IF. This translator generates a specification in an
intermediate format, called the Intermediate Format (IF).
After that the output format (OF) of AVISPA is generated
using one of the four back-ends: OFMC, CL-AtSe, STAMC
and TA4SP. The analysis of the OF is made as follows. The
first printed section called SUMMARY, indicates whether
the protocol is safe, unsafe, or whether the analysis is
inconclusive. DETAILS is the second section, which explains
under what condition the protocol is declared safe, or what
conditions have been used for finding an attack, or finally
why the analysis was inconclusive. Other remaining sections,
called PROTOCOL, GOAL and BACKEND, represent the
name of the protocol, the goal of the analysis and the
name of the back-end used, respectively. Finally, at the end
of the analysis, after some possible comments and the
statistics, the trace of the attack (if any) is also printed in
the usual Alice-Bob format. One can find more details on
HLPSL in Advanced Encryption Standard (2010) and
AVISPA (2013).
Some basic types available in HLPSL are (Advanced
Encryption Standard, 2010; AVISPA, 2013):
 agent: Values of type agent represent principal names. The
intruder is always assumed to have the special identifier i.
 public_key: These values represent agents’ public keys in a
public-key cryptosystem. For example, given a public
(respectively private) key pk, its inverse private (respectively
public) key is obtained by inv pk.
 symmetric_key: Variables of this type represent keys for a
symmetric-key cryptosystem.
 text: In HLPSL, text values are often used as nonces. These
values can be used for messages. IfNa is of type text (fresh),
thenNa0 will be a fresh value which the intruder cannot guess.
 nat: The nat type represents the natural numbers in non-
message contexts. const: This type represents constants.
 hash_func: The base type hash_func represents crypto-
graphic hash functions. The base type function also repre-
sents functions on the space of messages. It is assumed
that the intruder cannot invert hash functions (in essence,
that they are one-way).
 bool: Boolean values are useful for modeling, for instance,
binary flags.
The space of legal messages is defined as the closure of the
basic types. For a given message M and encryption key K, we
denote fMg K as the symmetric/public-key encryption using
the key K. For concatenations, HLPSL uses the associative
‘‘” operator. The ‘‘played_by A” declaration indicates that
the agent named in variable A plays in a particular role. A
knowledge declaration (generally in the top-level Environment
role) is used to specify the intruder’s initial knowledge. The
immediate reaction transitions have the form X ¼ j > Y, which
relate an event X and an action Y. If a variable V remains
permanently secret, it is expressed by the goal secrecy_of V.
If V is ever obtained or derived by the intruder, a security vio-
lation will result. The intruder, always denoted by ðiÞ, will have
the ability to intercept, analyze, and/or modify messages trans-
mitted over the insecure channel. witnessðA;B; id;EÞ declares
for a (weak) authentication property of A by B on E, declares
that agent A is witness for the information E; this goal will be
identified by the constant id in the goal section (AVISPA,
2013). This expresses that the agent named in variable B has
freshly generated the value E for the agent named in variable
A. The id term is a new constant that identifies the message
term upon which the goal should authenticate.
requestðB;A; id;EÞ indicates for a strong authentication prop-
erty of A by B on E, declares that agent B requests a check
of the value E; this goal will be identified by the constant id
in the goal section (AVISPA, 2013). This formalizes A’s accep-
tance of the value E as having generated for him/her by the
agent named in B.7.1. Specifying our scheme
The specification in HLPSL language for the role of the user
Ui in a group Sn is shown in Fig. 1. At first, during the regis-
tration phase of our scheme, a user Ui sends the registration
message hIDi; xi; pwii to the server S via a secure channel using
the Snd ðÞ operation. The channel declaration channel ðdyÞ
means that the channel is insecure, which is based the
Dolev–Yao threat model (as used in our threat model in Sec-
tion 5.2) (Dolev and Yao, 1983). Note that secret(Xi, PWi,
subs1, Ui) declares that both xi and pwi are kept secret to Ui
only using the protocol id, subs1. During the authenticated
key exchange phase, Ui sends the message hm1 ¼ fgxiMpwigi
via a public channel. After receiving the message
hm2 ¼ fgyiNpwi ;Eeki ½Sn;Ki1;K0igi from the server S by the
Rcv ðÞ operation, Ui broadcasts the messages hm3 ¼ fXigi
and hm4 ¼ fAuthi1;Authi2gi. witness(Ui, S, alice_bob_xi, Xi)
indicates that Ui has freshly generated the value xi for the ser-
ver S. By request(S, Ui, bob_alice_yi, Yi), Ui accepts of the
random nonce yi generated for Ui by the server S. In a similar
way, we have also implemented the specification in HLPSL
language for the roles of the server S and another user Uj in
a group Sn in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively.
Figure 1 Role specification in HLPSL for a user Ui in a group Sn
of our scheme.
Figure 2 Role specification in HLPSL for the server S of our
scheme.
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goal and environment of our scheme in Figs. 3 and 4. In the
session segment, all the basic roles: useri, userj and server are
instanced with concrete arguments. The top-level role, called
the environment, is always defined in the specification of
HLPSL language, which contains the global constants and a
composition of one or more sessions, where the intruder may
play some roles as legitimate users. The intruder also
participates in the execution of protocol as a concrete sessionduring the simulation. Goals are given in their own sections,
which generally come at the end of a HLPSL specification.
Goal is defined with the keyword goal and ends with end goal.
Between the two, multiple security goals may be listed in
HLPSL.
The following four secrecy goals and three authentications
are verified in our scheme for formal security verification:
Figure 3 Role specification in HLPSL for another user Uj in a
group Sn of our scheme.
igure 4 Role specification in HLPSL for the session and
nvironment of our scheme.
78 V. Odelu et al. secrecy_of subs1: It represents that the generated random
nonce xi and the password pwi are kept secret to the user
Ui only.
 secrecy_of subs2: It represents that the generated random
nonce yi is kept secret to the server S only.
 secrecy_of subs3: It represents that the secret value ski is
kept secret to the users Ui;Uj and the server S.
 secrecy_of subs4: It represents that the generated random
nonce xj and the password pwj are kept secret to another
user Uj in a group only.
 authentication_on alice_bob_xi: Ui generates a random
nonce xi, where xi is only known to Ui. When the server S
receives xi from the messages from Ui; S authenticates Ui.
 authentication_on alice_bob_xj: Uj generates a random
nonce xj, where xj is only known to Uj. When the server
S receives xj from the messages from Uj; S authenticates Uj.
 authentication_on bob_alice_yi: Sj generates a random
nonce yi, where yi is only known to S. When the user Ui
receives yi from the messages from S;Ui authenticates S.F
e7.2. Analysis of results
We have simulated our improved scheme using the AVISPA
web tool (AVISPA, 2014) for CL-AtSe back-end. For the replay
attack checking, the back-end checks whether the legitimate
agents can execute the specified protocol by performing a search
of a passive intruder. After that the back-end gives the intruder
the knowledge of some normal sessions between the legitimate
agents. For the Dolev–Yao model check, the back-end checks
whether there is any man-in-the-middle attack possible by the
intruder. The simulation results for the formal security verifica-
tion of our scheme using this back-end are shown in Fig. 5. The
summary of the results under this back-end clearly shows that
our scheme is safe. As a result, our scheme is secure against
the passive attacks and the active attacks, such as the replay
and man-in-the-middle attacks.
8. Performance comparison with related schemes
In this section, we compare the performance of our scheme
with Lee et al.’s SGPAKE scheme and other related existing
Figure 5 The result of the analysis using CL-AtSe backend of
our scheme.
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and Barua, 2006; Kim et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2013).
Table 4 shows the performance comparison of our scheme
with Lee et al.’s SGPAKE scheme (Lee et al., 2013), Abdalla
et al.’s scheme (Abdalla et al., 2006), Dutta and Barua’s
scheme (Dutta and Barua, 2006), Kim et al.’s scheme (Kim
et al., 2004) and Boyd and Nieto’s scheme (Boyd and Nieto,
2003). Boyd and Nieto’s scheme (Boyd and Nieto, 2003) and
Kim et al.’s scheme (Kim et al., 2004) are based on the public
key infrastructure (PKI) and they provide higher security.
However, they are required to maintain the complex and heavy
public key systems, and also the users must hold extra storage
for keeping public/private key pairs. Moreover, Boyd and Nie-
to’s scheme (Boyd and Nieto, 2003) lacks forward security, but
Kim et al.’s scheme (Kim et al., 2004) protocol can provide the
forward security. Abdalla et al.’s scheme (Abdalla et al., 2006),Table 4 Comparison of our improved scheme with related schemes
Abdalla et al. (2006) Dutta and Barua
(2006)
User’s public key No No
Formal security Yes Yes
User’s privacy A password shared
with all users
A password shared
with all users
Asymmetric en/
decryption
0 0
Signing/verifying 0 0
Exponentiation 3 3
Symmetric encryption/
decryption
3 nþ 3
Whether provides
forward security
Yes No
Whether provides users’
privacy
No No
a Two modular exponential computations can be pre-computed and thDutta and Barua’s scheme (Dutta and Barua, 2006), Lee
et al.’s scheme (Lee et al., 2013) and our proposed improved
scheme are not required to maintain the public key system.
Each user only needs to remember his/her weak password
without any extra equipment for storing long-term secret keys.
Lee et al.’s scheme (Lee et al., 2013) requires expensive expo-
nential computations than Dutta and Barua’s scheme and
Abdalla et al.’s scheme. However, Zhang et al. (2012) showed
that Dutta and Barua’s scheme (Dutta and Barua, 2006) is
insecure. In addition, Dutta and Barua’s scheme and Abdalla
et al.’s scheme do not provide users’ privacy. In Lee et al.’s
SGPAKE scheme (Lee et al., 2013), it needs to compute four
exponents gxiMpwi ; Ki ¼ gyi NpwiNpwi
 xi ¼ gxiyi ; Zi ¼ ðKi1Þxi and
Ziþ1 ¼ ðK0iÞxi , whereas the values Mpwi and Npwi are pre-
computed. Instead of computing the parameters Ki ¼ gxiyi ;
Ki1 ¼ gxi1yi1 and K0i ¼ gxiþ1yi in Step 2 of the authentication
and key exchange phase in Lee et al.’s SGPAKE scheme,
we have computed eki ¼ gxiyi ; Ki1 ¼ gxi1y2i1 and K0i ¼ gxiþ1y
2
i .
As a result, our improved scheme takes only one extra field
exponentiation to compute the encryption key eki (at the
server side) to enhance the security of Lee et al.’s SGPAKE
scheme. As in Abdalla et al.’s scheme, Dutta–Barua’s scheme,
Kim et al.’s scheme, Boyd–Nieto’s scheme and Lee et al.’s
SGPAKE scheme, in our scheme we have also omitted
the exponents required to compute the secret value
ski ¼ Zni  Xn1iþ1  Xn2iþ2      X1iþn1. In addition, our scheme
does not require any public key encryption and decryptions,
whereas Boyd–Nieto’s scheme requires a total of 2ðn 1Þ
public key encryption and decryptions, where n is the
number of members in a dynamic group Sn. Our scheme,
Abdalla et al.’s scheme, Dutta–Barua’s scheme and Lee
et al.’s SGPAKE scheme do not require any cost for
generating and verifying signatures. However, in Kim et al.’s
scheme and Boyd–Nieto’s scheme the number of signature
generation and verification is 2n and n, respectively. From
this table, it is clear that our scheme is efficient as
compared to other schemes. Furthermore, our scheme
provides formal security analysis and verification using
AVISPA tool. Considering better security as compared to
other related schemes, our scheme is much more applicable
for practical applications..
Kim et al.
(2004)
Boyd and Nieto
(2003)
Lee et al.
(2013)
Ours
Yes Yes No No
Yes Yes No Yes
PKI based PKI based A private
password
A private
password
0 2ðn 1Þ (total) 0 0
2n (total) n (total) 0 0
2 0 4(2a) 5(2a)
0 0 1 1
Yes No Yes Yes
Yes Yes No Yes
us they are ignored.
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In this paper, we have first reviewed Lee et al.’s SGPAKE
scheme. We have then shown that their scheme is vulnerable
to off-line password-guessing attack and thus, their scheme
fails to provide the users’ privacy property. To remedy the
security weakness found in Lee et al.’s SGPAKE scheme, we
have proposed an effective improvement over Lee et al.’s
SGPAKE scheme while retaining the original merits of Lee
et al.’s SGPAKE scheme. We have provided both informal
and formal security analysis of our scheme, and shown that
our improved scheme is secure against various known attacks
including off-line weak password guessing attack which is
found in Lee et al.’s SGPAKE scheme. Therefore, our scheme
provides data as well as users’ privacy whereas Lee et al.’s
scheme does not provide those properties. Moreover, our
improved scheme is also efficient as compared to the other
related schemes such as Abdalla et al.’s scheme, Dutta–Barua’s
scheme, Kim et al.’s scheme, Boyd–Nieto’s scheme, and Lee
et al.’s scheme. In addition, we have simulated our scheme
for the formal security analysis using the widely-accepted
AVISPA tool and shown that our scheme is secure against
active and passive attacks. As a result, our scheme is much
suitable for practical scenarios as compared to Lee et al’s
SGPAKE scheme and other related schemes.
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